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Computing Nash equilibria Gets Harder — New Results Show
Hardness Even for Parameterized Complexity
Vladimir Estivill-Castro Mahdi Parsa





In this paper we show that some decision problems
regarding the computation of Nash equilibria are to
be considered particularly hard. Most decision prob-
lems regarding Nash equilibria have been shown to
be NP-complete. While some NP-complete problems
can find an alternative to tractability with the tools of
Parameterized Complexity Theory, it is also the case
that some classes of problems do not seem to have
fixed-parameter tractable algorithms. We show that
k-Uniform Nash and k-Minimal Nash support
are W [2]-hard. Given a game G=(A,B) and a non-
negative integer k, the k-Uniform Nash problem
asks whether G has a uniform Nash equilibrium of size
k. The k-Minimal Nash support asks whether G
has Nash equilibrium such that the support of each
player’s Nash strategy has size equal to or less than
k. First, we show that k-Uniform Nash (with k
as the parameter) is W [2]-hard even when we have
2 players, or fewer than 4 different integer values in
the matrices. Second, we illustrate that even in zero-
sum games k-Minimal Nash support is W [2]-hard
(a sample Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum 2-player
game can be found in polynomial time (von Sten-
gel 2002)). Thus, it must be the case that other
more general decision problems are also W [2]-hard.
Therefore, the possible parameters for fixed parame-
ter tractability in those decision problems regarding
Nash equilibria seem elusive.
Keywords: Parameterized complexity, Game theory,
Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The modern mathematical treatment of the study of
decisions taken by participants whose interests are
in conflict is now generally labeled as “game theory”
and its origins are attributed to von Neumann who
developed the mini-max theorem. Although Borel
had formalized earlier the concept of pure and mixed
strategies, the first book in the field (von Neumann
& Morgenstern 1947) established most of the area.
One of the core concepts is now known as Nash equi-
libria after John Nash. Although Nash’s theorem is
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the generalization of more than two participants re-
garding an earlier known result for two players, his
approach provided a series of new insights. Nash es-
tablished that every finite game with a finite num-
ber of players had to have a stable outcome (maybe
with mixed strategies), where no participant would
change their decision-making process even if it were
to know the decision-making process of other players.
Nash proved this result using Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem and in doing so provided a simpler proof
to von Neumann’s mini-max theorem (although the
original proof also used Brouwer’s fixed-point theo-
rem (Luce & Raiffa 1957)). Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem requires topological notions regarding con-
tinuous functions and its proof is non-constructive.
Therefore, this existence result did not provide an al-
gorithm to find such Nash equilibria.
Nash equilibria are important because they repre-
sent the outcome of many scenarios, many of which
have been previously used to model the behavior
of participants (governments, unions, individuals)
in many social models. However, scenarios where
game theory applies now emerge in many multi-
agent interactions. Tardos & Vazirani (2007) illus-
trate that the canonical example of a game (the
Prisoner’s Dilemma) actually can be the setting for
making decisions by two Internet service providers
(ISPs) who must simultaneously choose between two
routing schemes. Given a game computation of
Nash equilibria (or designing algorithms for obtain-
ing them) has been labeled the most important com-
plexity problem of this time (Papadimitriou 2001).
While finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum
games can be performed in polynomial time using
tools from linear programming (von Stengel 2002),
the situation becomes much more complex as soon
as three or more players are involved (Tardos &
Vazirani 2007) (replacing zero-sum, that is comple-
mentary pay-offs, with common pay-offs results in
NP-Completeness results even for 2 players (Chu &
Halpern 2001)). The computation of Nash equilib-
ria is not a decision problem, and therefore, an al-
ternative tool has been introduced to show that it is
unlikely that Nash equilibria can be found in poly-
nomial time (Papadimitriou 2007). In particular,
the class PPAD 1 was used to show that the find-
ing of Nash equilibria is at least as hard as the find-
ing of fixed points in settings where Brouwer’s the-
orem applies. However, the first complexity results
for computing Nash equilibria used classic notions of
complexity theory. In particular, NP-Completeness
proofs for decision problems regarding Nash equilibria
are interesting (Gilboa & Zemel 1989). Those proofs
were achieved from reductions from Clique and Set
Cover. After this early complexity results, several
researchers have introduced different types of equi-
libria and games. Typically, the same NP-hard re-
1polynomial parity argument (decision case).
sults have been achieved (Bonifaci et al. 2008, Abbott
et al. 2005, Codenotti & Stefankovic 2005, Conitzer
& Sandholm 2003), perhaps with more specialized
games. In this paper we establish the parameterized
complexity of finding uniform Nash equilibria in imi-
tation games and computing the minimal support of
Nash equilibria for normal form games for the follow-
ing reasons:
• Parameterized complexity has advanced the al-
gorithm design for many NP-complete prob-
lems (Downey & Fellows 1998, Niedermeier
2006).
• “A uniform mixed strategy is probably the sim-
plest way of mixing pure strategies” (Bonifaci
et al. 2008).
• There is a corresponding one-to-one relation be-
tween Nash equilibria of two-player games and
Nash strategies for the row player in an imita-
tion game (Codenotti & Stefankovic 2005).
• Finding the support of a Nash equilibrium leads
to fining a sample Nash equilibrium in polyno-
mial time, hence the first trivial parameter for
computing a sample Nash equilibrium can be
considered the size of the support of Nash equi-
librium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we give formal definitions for game, graph and
parameterized complexity and review some theorems.
In Section 3, we prove the main parameterized hard-
ness results of the paper. In Section 4 we discuss
further the implications of our results for bi-matrix
games.
2 Preliminaries
We review notation and concepts in three areas: game
theory, graph theory, and parameterized complex-
ity theory, since these preliminaries are necessary to
present our main result.
2.1 Game theory
A two-player normal form game (also bi-matrix game)
G consists of two matrices A = (aij)m×n and B =
(bij)m×n, where aij denotes the payoff for the first
player and bij denotes the payoff for second player
when the first player plays his i-th strategy and the
second player plays his j-th strategy. We will identify
the first player as the row player and second player as
the column player. Therefore, a row is a pure strategy
for the row player while a column is a pure strategy
for the column player. Players select their strategy
without knowledge of their opponent’s choices and the
objective of each player is to individually maximize
their payoff.
While in general, there may be different types of
games, here we study imitation games and Zero-Sum
games and we will explain them explicitly in the rest
of this section.2 A mixed strategy for a player is a
probability distribution over his pure strategy space.
Definition 2.1 A mixed strategy ~x for a player is an
ordered n-tuple (x1, ..., xn) where
∑i=n
i=1 xi = 1 and
xi ≥ 0. We denote the probability space over the set
of rows of A and columns of B by ∆(A) and ∆(B),
respectively.
2Note that when presenting negative/hardness complexity re-
sults, choosing a more special case of the problem is useful because
the hardness of the special problem implies the hardness of the gen-
eral problem as the special problem reduces trivially to the general
problem.
The support of mixed strategy ~x is the set of pure
strategies which are played with positive probability,
that is {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi > 0}, and we will denote it
by supp(~x). Amixed strategy profile is an ordered pair
(~x, ~y) where ~x is a mixed strategy of the row player
and ~y is a mixed strategy for the column player. A
pure strategy can be considered a deterministic al-
gorithm, while a mixed strategy can be considered
a way to participate in the game with a randomized
algorithm. The difference is important because not
every game has each player using a pure strategy and
remaining this way even with the knowledge of the
other player’s strategy. However, every game has at
least one stable outcome with mixed strategies.
Definition 2.2 In a bi-matrix game G = (A,B) a
strategy profile (~x∗, ~y∗) is a Nash equilibrium if
∀~x ∈ ∆(A) ~x∗TA~y∗ ≥ ~xTA~y∗, and
∀~y ∈ ∆(B) ~x∗TB~y∗ ≥ ~x∗TB~y.
Clearly, by definition, in a Nash equilibrium no player
wants to deviate from the equilibrium points, even
when the opponent’s strategies become known. In
other words, a strategy profile (~x∗, ~y∗) is a Nash equi-
librium if and only if the strategy ~x∗ of the row player
is a best response to the strategy ~y∗ of the column
player and vice versa. The following result (von Sten-
gel 2002) shows that for Nash equilibria, if we are pro-
vided with the strategy of one player, we can easily
compute the other player’s best strategy to complete
the profile for a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2.1 In a bi-matrix game G=(A,B), the
strategy ~x of the row player is the best response to
the column player’s ~y strategy if and only if
∀i
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To find the support of the other player given the Nash
equilibrium component of one player, we find maxi-
mum values in the vector of payoffs that results from
the opponent’s Nash equilibrium’s strategy being ap-
plied to the matrix of the player. By linear program-
ming we can compute the other mixed strategy of the
Nash strategy profile. We focus on Zero-Sum games
(games whose matrices are the negative of each other,
ie.e. G=(A,−A)). The following theorem is one of
the central theorems for of Zero-Sum games, and it is
known as Minimax theorem.
Theorem 2.2 In Zero-Sum game G=(A,−A), a
strategy profile (~x∗,~y∗) is a Nash equilibrium if and























As we mentioned in the introduction we are in-
terested in imitation games. In an imitation game,
the row player receives a payoff of 1 if he plays the
same strategy as the column player but otherwise he
receives 0. In other words, an imitation game can be
expressed as a pair of matrices (I,M), where I is the
identity matrix and M is a square matrix.
Theorem 2.3 Let (~x∗,~y∗) be a Nash equilibrium of
the imitation game (I,M), then supp(~x∗) ⊆ supp(~y∗).
Proof: By contradiction, we let i ∈ supp(~x∗) and
i /∈ supp(~y∗) (thus, y∗i = 0). Since (~x∗, ~y∗) is a








This contradicts y∗i = 0. 
The study of imitation games is also justified, be-
cause any bi-matrix game G can be transformed into
an imitation game with a one to one relation between
Nash equilibria of G and the Nash strategies of the
row player in the corresponding imitation game (Co-
denotti & Stefankovic 2005).
Lemma 2.1 Let G=(A,B) be a bi-matrix game and




. If C does not have a zero row, then
there is a one-to-one relation between Nash equilibria
of G and Nash strategies for the row player in the im-
itation game (I,C), where I is the identity matrix of
size 2n.
Definition 2.3 A mixed strategy ~x is called a uni-
form mixed strategy if for all i ∈ supp(~x), we have
xi = 1/‖supp(~x)‖.
That is, xi = xj , for all i, j ∈ supp(~x). A Nash
equilibrium (~x,~y) is called a uniform Nash equilibrium
if both mixed strategies ~x and ~y are uniform mixed
strategies.
2.2 Graph theory
Definition 2.4 A graph G is a pair (V ,E) of sets
where E ⊆ {{u, v} : u, v ∈ V }. The members of V
are called vertices and the sets {u, v} ∈ E are called
edges of G. An induced subgraph of G = (V,E) is a
graph G′=(V ′,E′) such that V ′ ⊆ V,E′ ⊆ E and we
have ∀v1, v2 ∈ V ′ [{v1, v2} ∈ E =⇒ {v1, v2} ∈ E′] .
For a given subset V ′ of V , the induced subgraph by
V ′ is denoted by GV ′ .
Definition 2.5 A graph G=(V ,E) is called complete
if for all v1, v2 ∈ V , {v1, v2} ∈ E. An induced com-
plete subgraph of a graph G = (V,E) is called a clique.
Definition 2.6 A graph G=(V ,E) is called regular
if for all v1, v2 ∈ V , d(v1) = d(v2) where d(v) is the
degree of the vertex v and is given by d(v) = ‖{u ∈
V : {u, v} ∈ E}‖.
Lemma 2.2 Let V ′ ⊆ V so that GV ′ has at least one
edge. Consider u ∈ V \ V ′. If GV ′ and GV ′∪{u} are
regular, then both are cliques.
Proof: Let d ≥ 1 be the degree of GV ′ . Then, from
the regularity of GV ′∪{u}, it must have a positive
degree and there must be an edge {u, v} involving
u. Then, the degree of u must be the same as the
degree of v which is d + 1. That is, u is a neighbor
of all the vertices of V ′. This implies that any vertex
of GV ′∪{u} should have the same degree as u. Hence
every vertex in GV ′ has degree d because in this
graph u is not involved. Thus, both graphs are
complete. 
2.3 Parameterized complexity theory
R. Downey and M. Fellows introduced the field of
parameterized complexity theory (Downey & Fellows
1998). In contrast to classical complexity, in parame-
terized complexity the decision problem is organized
in two parts, namely, the input and the parameter.
Definition 2.7 A parameterized problem is a lan-
guage L ⊆ Σ∗ × N , where Σ is a finite alphabet.
The second component of the problem is called the
parameter.
We illustrate the distinction with an example of classi-
cal decision problem before reviewing the complexity
classes in this theory.
Classical Decision Problem
Max Clique
Instance : GraphG=(V ,E) and positive integer
k.
Question : Is there a subset V ′ of V such that
GV ′ constitutes a maximal clique of
size k?.
The parameterized version is usually referred to as
the p-version (Chen & Flum 2008).
Parameterized Decision Problem
p-Max Clique
Instance : GraphG=(V ,E) and positive integer
k.
Parameter : Positive integer k.
Question : Is there a subset V ′ of V such that
GV ′ constitutes a maximal clique of
size k?.
Parameterized complexity aims at providing an al-
ternative to exponential algorithms for NP-complete
problems by identifying a formulation where the pa-
rameter would take small values in practice, and shift-
ing the exponential explosion to this parameter while
the rest of the computation is polynomial in the size
of the input. A parameterized problem L is fixed-
parameter tractable if there is an algorithm that de-
cides in f(k)nO(1) time whether (x, k) ∈ L, where f is
an arbitrary computable function depending only on
k. FPT denotes the complexity class that contains all
fixed-parameter tractable problems. Similar to classi-
cal complexity theory, Downey and Fellows (Downey
& Fellows 1998) advanced parameterized reduction
and completeness notions for the fact that some prob-
lems did not appear to be fixed parameter tractable.
Definition 2.8 Let L,L′ ⊆ Σ∗ × N be two parame-
terized problems. We say L reduces to L′ by a stan-
dard parameterized (many-to-one) reduction if there
are functions k 7→ k′ and k 7→ k′′ from N to N and a
function (x, k) 7→ x′ from Σ∗ ×N to Σ∗ such that
• (x, k) 7→ x′ is computable in k′′ · | (x, k) |c time
for some constant c and
• (x, k) ∈ L if and only if (x′, k′) ∈ L′.
Classical complexity theory has CNF-Satisfia-
bility as a core problem. The question is to
decide whether a given Boolean formula in con-
junctive normal form (CNF) has a truth assign-
ment or not. Deciding whether a given Boolean
formula in conjunctive normal form has an as-
signment with a certain number of true variables
is called Weighted CNF-Satisfiability. More-
over, if the length of each clause in the CNF
Boolean formula is equal to or less than t, then
the CNF formula is said to be a t-CNF for-
mula. Naturally, the corresponding decision problems
are called t-CNF-Satisfiability and t-Weighted
CNF-Satisfiability, respectively. Parameterized
tractability of Weighted 2-CNF-Satisfiability is
not known (Niedermeier 2006) and W [1] is a basic
class for fixed intractability.
Definition 2.9 The class W [1] contains all prob-
lems that can be reduced to Weighted 2-CNF-
Satisfiability by a parameterized reduction.
Definition 2.10 A parameterized problem (L, k)
is called W [1]-hard if the parameterized problem
Weighted 2-CNF-Satisfiability can be reduced
to (L, k) by a parameterized reduction.
A problem in W [1] that satisfies both of the above
properties is W [1]-complete. Analogously, the class
W [2] is defined by swapping Weighted 2-CNF-s
with Weighted CNF-Satisfiability (Niedermeier
2006).
Theorem 2.4 FPT ⊆W [1] ⊆W [2].
There are many problems inW [1] andW [2]. No FPT
algorithms have been found for any problem in W [1].
The above classes may be equal (if NP=P, for exam-
ple); however, there is evidence to suspect (Downey
& Fellows 1998) that W [2]-hardness is a strong indi-
cation of intractability in the FPT sense.
3 Parameterized hardness result
In this section we prove the W [2]-hardness of two
Nash equilibria problems. From these other Nash
equilibria problems become W [2]-hard as well. The
first proof uses Max-Clique while the second one
uses a parameterized reduction from Set Cover.
3.1 Finding uniform Nash equilibrium is un-
likely to be FPT
A link between Nash equilibria and the maximal
cliques of a graph, as well as asymptotically stable sta-
tionary points of quadratic programming problems,
was established by Bomze (1997, Theorem 9 and
Theorem 10). Later, this link was extended to sta-
tionary points and Karash-Kuhn-Tucker points of cer-
tain forms (Bomze 1998). Recently, McLennan and
Tourky (McLennan & Tourky 2005) advanced those
ideas to introduce a reduction from Max Clique to
show that several decision problems regarding Nash
equilibria in imitation games are NP-Complete. Imi-
tation games have a close relationship with symmet-
ric games (McLennan & Tourky 2005) (and thus, the
NP-hardness results for imitation games imply NP-
hardness results for symmetric games). It is not un-
usual that a proof of NP-Completeness does not re-
sult in a proof of hardness for parameterized complex-
ity. The Vertex cover problem can be reduced
to the Independent set problem to show that the
later is NP-Complete. However, the reduction is not
a parameterized reduction and the Vertex cover
problem lies in FPT while the Independent set
problem is only known to be in W [1]. Some proofs
of NP-Complete problems related to Nash equilibria
used Satisfiability as the problem that is reduced
by constructing a game (Conitzer & Sandholm 2003),
but they are not parameterized reductions. Another
proof also used Clique (Gilboa & Zemel 1989) but
this reduction is also not a parameterized reduction.
McLennan and Tourky (McLennan & Tourky 2005)
provide additional properties of the resulting game in
the transformation and its Nash equilibria. McLen-
nan & Tourky (2005) did not work with uniform Nash
equilibrium. The complexity of finding Nash equi-
libria that are uniform mixed strategies has received
attention even more recently (Bonifaci et al. 2008).
We follow the McLennan and Tourky (McLennan
& Tourky 2005) reduction to prove our hardness re-
sults. We consider the following problem.
k-Uniform Nash
Instance : An imitation game G=(I,M).
Parameter : Positive integer k.
Question : Is there a uniform Nash equilibrium
(~x, ~x) such that ‖supp(~x)‖ = k?
We now prove that it is unlikely this problem has a
fixed-parameter algorithm.
Theorem 3.1 k-Uniform Nash is W [2]-hard.
In order to prove the theorem, we will produce a
parameterized reduction from p-Max Clique. The
p-Max Clique problem is W [2]-complete (Chen &
Flum 2008). We will use a specialized version of
Max Clique where we know there is one vertex that
has an edge to every other vertex.
Lemma 3.1 Consider an input [graph G=(V ,E), in-
teger k] of Max Clique. We construct a new graph
G′=(V ′,E′) such that V ′ = V ∪ {u} where u /∈ V
and E′ = E ∪ {{u, v} : v ∈ V }. The reduction
[G= (V,E), k] 7→ [G′ = (V ′, E′), k′ = k + 1] is a pa-
rameterized reduction with the property that G has a
maximal clique of size k if and only if G′ has maximal
clique of size k′.
Lemma 3.2 Consider [G=(V ,E), integer k] where
there is a vertex u connected to every vertex v ∈ V .
We construct a new graph G′=(V ′,E′) as follows. Its
set of vertices is V ′ = V \ {u} and its edges are E′ =
E \ {{u, v} : v ∈ V }. The reduction [G= (V,E), k] 7→
[G′ = (V ′, E′), k′ = k−1] is a parameterized reduction
with the property that G has a maximal clique of size
k if and only if G′ has maximal clique of size k′.
The above two lemmas follow directly from
Lemma 2.2 and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 Let G=(V ,E) be a graph with a vertex
connected to every vertex v ∈ V and let k be a positive
integer (the parameter). Deciding whether G has a
maximal clique of size k is W [2]-complete.
Now, we describe the reduction, assuming the
instance of Max Clique (an undirected graph
G=(V ,E) and an integer k) has one vertex adja-
cent to all others. Label the vertices in the in-
put of Max Clique with V = {1, . . . , n}. As the
corresponding instance of k-Uniform Nash we in-
troduce an imitation game G=(I,M) such that M
is the column-player’s payoff matrix. The matrix
M = (mij) is defined as follows:
mij =
{
1 if {i, j} ∈ E,
1/2 if i = j, and
0 otherwise.
(1)
Clearly this instance can be found in polynomial
time (McLennan & Tourky 2005) in the size of
G=(V ,E) and more importantly, the parameter k′ is
set to k.
To prove this is a reduction, we need to establish
the correspondence between YES-instances to YES-
instances, and NO-instances to NO-instances. We de-
note by G~x the induced subgraph over the support of
a uniform Nash equilibrium (~x,~x).
Lemma 3.4 The strategy profile (~x,~x) is a k-
uniform Nash equilibrium of the imitation game
(I,M), if and only if G~x is a maximal clique of size
k.
Proof:
(⇒) Let (~x,~x) be k-uniform Nash equilibrium of
(I,M) and assume them-th vertex connects to all
other vertices of G. Because I is the payoff ma-
trix of the first player, in a Nash equilibrium the
first player always places in its support a strat-
egy played by the second player (it is an imitation
game). The first player has payoff 1/k2 always
and therefore will maximize its payoff by mini-
mizing its support to the support of the second
player. Because M is the payoff of the second
player, for the second player, a uniform strategy
has payoff (k − 1)/k + 1/(2k) = 1 − 1/(2k) if
the support is a clique of size k (less than this if
some edge is missing in the graph induced by the
support). Thus, Player 2 wants to maximize the
support to get a payoff as close as possible to 1
but can only do this for cliques.
Claim 1 : m ∈ supp(~x). Suppose m /∈ supp(~x)
and let j ∈ supp(~x). Then, the ex-
pected payoff when playing j by the sec-
ond player is (~xTM)j = 1 − 1/(2k). How-
ever, (~xTM)m = 1 because m is adjacent
to all other vertices and m /∈ supp(~x). But
then (~xTM)m > (~xTM)j when j ∈ supp(~x).
This contradicts Theorem 2.1 because (~x,~x)
is a Nash equilibrium.
Claim 2: G~x is a clique. From Theorem 2.1,
one can find that ∀i, j ∈ supp(~x) implies
(~xTM)i = (~xTM)j . In other words, for ev-
ery pair i, j in supp(~x) the following expres-
sions 3 regarding their payoff are equal
1 · 1/k · dG~x(i) + 1/2 · 1/k and,
1 · 1/k · dG~x(j) + 1/2 · 1/k
where dG~x(i) is the degree of vertex i in G~x.
Therefore, the degree of vertex i and the
degree of j in G~x are the same. Hence we
have a regular subgraph which has a vertex
that connects to all others, therefore G~x is
a clique.
Claim 3: The clique G~x is maximal. Thi is sim-
ilar to Claim 1. If t is connected to every
vertex in supp(~x), but t /∈ supp(~x), we have
1 = (~xTM)t > (~xTM)j for any j ∈ supp(~x).
This contradicts the assertion that (~x,~x) is
Nash equilibrium because of Theorem 2.1
(⇐) Let G~x be a maximal clique of size k (we have
k-entries in ~x equal to 1/k and all other are zero).
As we mentioned earlier, it is not hard to inspect
M and find that the payoff of each i in supp(~x)
is given by (~xTM)i = 1 · (k− 1)/k+ 1/2 · 1/k. If
k = n, then G is the complete graph and by The-
orem 2.1, (~x,~x) is a uniform Nash equilibrium.
If k < n, for any t /∈ supp(~x) there is at least
one i ∈ supp(~x) which {i, t} /∈ E. Therefore,
(~xTM)t < 1 · (k − 1)/k + 1/2 · 1/k. But then,
again from Theorem 2.1, (~x,~x) is Nash equilib-
rium.

This completes the proof that k-Uniform Nash is
W [2]-hard.
The claims in the above proofs enable us to con-
sider another problem.
3Each term in the expressions is the product of the payoff, times
the probability of playing it, times the number of repetitions.
Maximum Payoff for 2nd Player
Instance : An imitation game G=(I,M).
Parameter : Positive integer k.
Question : Does G have a uniform Nash equilib-
rium (~x, ~x) such that the payoff for
Player 2 is at least k?
Suppose we modify the payoff matrix in Equation (1)
as follows. Let M now be given by
mij =
{
2k if {i, j} ∈ E,
k if i = j, and
0 otherwise.
(2)
Note that a clique of size t corresponds to a mixed
strategy for the second player with payoff 2k(t−1)/t+
k/t and thus, if the clique has size k, the payoff is 2k+
1. The claims in the proof of the previous theorem
directly imply the following results.
Corollary 3.1 Let [G=(V ,E),integer k] be an in-
stance of Max Clique. The reduction [G=
(V,E), k] 7→ [G(I,M), k′ = 2k + 1] is a parameterized
reduction for Max Clique to Maximum Payoff
for 2nd Player. Moreover, the graph G=(V ,E)
has maximal clique of size k if and only if the G has a
Nash equilibrium in which the column player’s payoff
is at least k′.
Corollary 3.2 Let G=(I,M) be an imitation game
and k be an integer. Deciding whether G has Nash
equilibrium in which the second player’s payoff is at
least k is W [2]-hard.
3.2 Finding Nash equilibrium with smallest
support is unlikely to be FPT
We now show a different concern that also seems very
hard to resolve, even with exponential time in the
parameter and polynomial time for the size of the in-
put. This will bring more light into the challenges
faced when characterizing the complexity of comput-
ing Nash equilibria. We show that deciding whether
a game has a Nash equilibrium with a support of size
equal to or less than a fixed integer number is hard (in
the matter of parameterized complexity). Alterna-
tively, minimizing the support of a Nash equilibrium
is at least as hard as the parameterized decision prob-
lem, and we are showing that this is unlikely to be
FPT. We will prove this for a more specialized type of
game, those where one player’s loss is the opponent’s
gain; those are called Zero-Sum games. The negative
result for Zero-Sum games propagates to more gen-
eral (arbitrary games). In other words, we will show
the following decision problem is W [2]-hard.
k-Minimal Nash support
Instance : A Zero-Sum game G=(A,−A).
Parameter : Positive integer k.
Question : Does G have a Nash equi-
librium (~x, ~y) such that
max{‖supp(~x)‖, ‖supp(~y)‖} ≤ k?
Our hardness result is based on a parameter-
ized reduction from an instance from Set Cover.
Set Cover is W [2]-complete (Downey & Fellows
1998).
Set Cover
Instance : A family S = {S1, ..., Sr} of r subsets
of set N = {1, ..., n} that covers N ,
that is
⋃
i=1,...,r Si = N .
Parameter : Positive integer k ≤ r.
Question : Does S have a subset of size at most
k such that it covers N?
Theorem 3.2 k-Minimal Nash support is W [2]-
hard.
Let (N ,S,r,k) be an instance of Set Cover. We con-
struct a Zero-Sum game (A,−A) where A(r+1)×(n+1)




1 if i ≤ r, j ≤ n, j ∈ Si,
0 if i ≤ r, i ≤ n, j /∈ Si,
1/k if i ≤ r, j = n+ 1,
1/2r if i = r + 1.
(3)
Clearly, constructing this game given an instance of
Set Cover requires polynomial time. The following
result shows that the parameter k remains unchanged
(and thus does not depend on n). Moreover, YES-
instances are mapped to and only to YES-instances
while NO-instances are mapped to and only to NO-
instances. Therefore this is a parameterized reduc-
tion.
Theorem 3.3 The cover S of the set N has a sub-
cover of size k or less if and only if the game
G=(A,−A) defined in Equation 3 has a Nash equi-
librium such that the size of the support of the Nash
strategy is at most k.
Proof: We first make some observations about the
game in Equation 3.
Claim 1: The support of a mixed strategy chosen
by the row player must be a cover. Consider a
mixed strategy ~x for the row player. Otherwise,
if the set J = supp(~x) \ {r+1} is such that N "⋃
i∈J Si, then the second player can improve (and
therefore reduce the payoff of the first player) by
playing t ∈ N \⋃i∈J Si.
Claim 2: The first player has a guaranteed payoff of
1/r. The mixed strategy ~xT0 = (1/r, . . . , 1/r, 0)
(that is, the uniform distribution on the first
r pure strategies and probability 0 for the last
one) is a cover because the game was derived
from an instance of Set Cover and has payoff
1/r (the second player plays n + 1 with proba-
bility 1). Also, because we have an instance of
Set Cover, the value k is no more than r, or
1/r ≤ 1/k.
(⇒) Assume G has a Nash equilibrium (~x∗,~y∗) in
which the support of both players has at most
size k. From the Minimax Theorem 2.2 the ex-
pected payoff for the first player is at least 1/r.
The first player does not play strategy r + 1
purely (the payoff for playing that strategy is at
most 1/2r and it contradicts that the minimum
payoff for the first player is at least 1/r ), there-
fore the set J = supp(~x∗)−{r+1} is not empty.
But by the claims above the set T =
⋃
i∈J Si
equals N . Furthermore our assumption on the
size of supports of Nash strategies assures us that
the size of J is at most k (that is a cover of size
at most k).
(⇐) Let Si1 ,Si2 ,. . . ,Sik constitute a sub-cover of size
k for N . We define mixed strategies ~x and ~y for
the row and column player as follows:
xi =
{
1/k if i ∈ {i1, i2 . . . , ik},
0 otherwise, and,
yn+1 = 1, yj = 0 for j ≤ n.
Claim: The strategy profile (~x,~y )is a Nash
equilibrium for the game G.
In order to show that (~x,~y) is a Nash equi-
librium, we recall Theorem 2.1. Note that
~x is the best response to ~y and vice versa,
because for any i ∈ supp(~x) and for all
j ∈ supp(~y) we have
(A~y)i = max
t=1,...,r+1






Parameterized complexity researchers aim at de-
veloping fixed-parameter tractable algorithms for
NP-Complete problems. This provides a path to
tractability, and the exact solving of very hard prob-
lems. A very important aspect of this enterprise for
FPT algorithm is the identification of suitable pa-
rameters for the problems (Downey & Fellows 1998).
One would be inclined to believe that finding the sup-
port for Nash strategies in the game is a milestone
to finding a sample Nash equilibrium(because once is
found, the actual strategies can be found in polyno-
mial time). In finding the support, a subproblem is
to find its size (if we had the support, we can trivially
find its size). So, finding the size of the support is per-
haps the easiest milestone in computing Nash equilib-
ria. The support size also seems a reasonable parame-
ter to parameterize the quest for Nash strategies. Our
results show that probably there is no FPT algorithm
for finding Nash equilibria with the property that the
support size of each Nash strategy is equal to or less
than k even in Zero-Sum games (the hardness result
can be extended to general bi-matrix games because
Zero-Sum games are just a special case). This implies
that decision problems for computing Nash equilibria
are far from being tractable.
We also illustrated that solving the
k-Uniform Nash in imitation games is hard in
the sense of parameterized complexity. This result
reveals that finding such Nash equilibria for the
general class of normal form games is W [2]-hard.
Moreover, from Lemma 2.1 and the hardness results
of k-Uniform Nash, it can be concluded that in
any bi-matrix game G=(A,B), deciding whether
both players play a uniform strategy in which the
sum of size of their Nash strategies support is k is
W [2]-hard.
McLennan & Tourky (2005) introduced the notion
of I-equilibrium in the class of imitation games and
its relation with symmetric equilibrium of symmetric
games4. They presented a list of NP-hard decision
problems for imitation games and their correspond-
ing decision problems in symmetric games. From
McLennan & Tourky (2005, Proposition 1), it arises
that every uniform Nash equilibrium (~x,~x) is an I-
equilibrium, but the reverse is not true. However, the
same parameterized hardness result holds for sym-
metric games, that is, deciding whether a symmetric
game has a k-uniform Nash equilibrium (~x,~x) isW [2]-
hard. But, our other parameterized results would not
extend to its symmetric counterparts. For example,
classifying the following decision problem (within the
complexity classes of parameterized complexity the-
ory) is still open.
4A bi-matrix G=(A,B) is called symmetric if A = BT . A Nash
equilibrium of the form (~x,~x) is called a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium.
Instance : A symmetric game G=(M ,M) where
M is symmetric matrix.
Parameter : Positive integer k.
Question : Does the game G have symmetric
Nash equilibrium such that the pay-
off of each player is equal to or
greater than k?
To the best of our knowledge, our results here are
the first link between parameterized complexity the-
ory and computation of Nash equilibria, after an ear-
lier FPT result on computing an approximation Nash
equilibria (Kalyanaraman & Umans 2007).
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